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Abstract 
The outcome of the 2016 European Union membership referendum is re-shaping the 
United Kingdom’s relationship with the EU through shifting geopolitical 
positioning(s) and the (re)introduction of barriers and boundaries and also 
challenging British and EU citizens to revise their everyday sense of belonging. 
Accordingly, Brexit incorporates emergent and contested political projects of 
belonging, determining anew who belongs in a post-EU Britain. This paper discusses 
research directions focusing on the construction of political and everyday senses of 
belonging implied by public debates on Brexit, and critically examines the shifts in 
attitude towards received citizenship and different degrees of social exclusion.  
 
Introduction 
Following a referendum in June 2016 the UK narrowly voted to leave the European 
Union amid heated debates and conflictual information regarding key issues. The 
process of exiting the EU is about to begin, however current discussions are taking 
place in a climate of political, economic, social, and cultural uncertainties. One of the 
most controversial issues raised by Brexit is the question of belonging (Gilmartin, 
Wood and O’Callaghan, 2018). This is not simply a matter of changing political 
affiliations, especially the growing relationship of British society to the transnational 
networks and institutions called the European Union. It is also, and primarily, a matter 
of everyday senses of being inside or outside a community, a consensus or what 
Anderson and Wilson recently called ‘the EU’s affective present – the multiple senses 
of what the contemporary feels like to live in’ (Anderson and Wilson, 2017: 2). A 
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number of fundamental questions have arisen which seemingly await further public 
and academic discussion. Who can claim (and does so) to belong to British society? 
Will belonging be a matter of external ascription (e.g. by citizenship or ethnicity) or 
of free individual choice? What ways of living together in a socially unequal, 
fragmented and increasingly polarised society are emerging on the grounds of new 
senses of belonging?  
At present it is not only the public who are struggling with the new awareness of the 
implications of belonging, in particular the tension between external positioning and 
self-positioning of social actors; it is also the social sciences which are experiencing 
unexpected uncertainties of how to deal with this aspect of Brexit. It is certainly true 
that ‘Brexit became an occasion of dissensus and the complex enactment and 
reproduction of existing power relations and inequalities; intensifying, revealing and 
foregrounding existing divides of class, age, ethnicity, race, and locality, while also 
cutting across other commonalities...’ (Anderson and Wilson, 2017: 1). But there is 
still more about the everyday implications of Brexit that exceeds this traditional 
understanding of politically induced social change. What has become obvious is that 
although shifting modes of social in-/exclusion, identity building and belonging call 
for context-sensitive theorizing, the concepts presently at hand are mostly 
decontextualized and not directly applicable to the specificities of Brexit.  
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework for 
approaching the issue of Brexit-related belonging. It does so by exploring the concept 
of autochthony as a more elastic notion for the basis of belonging than more familiar 
and seemingly fixed categories, such as ‘race’, ‘citizenship’, ‘religion’, ‘gender’. We 
contend that shifting, often vague, understandings of autochthony inform various 
everyday politics of belonging. This, in turn, makes it difficult to directly assign 
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emerging cleavages, such as those that have been expressed by the opposition of 
Brexiteers and Remainers, to the well-known drivers of social inequality of the past 
(cf. Anderson and Wilson, 2017). Therefore careful analytical reconstruction of such 
everyday politics is necessary to grasp the connotations and situated positionings of 
social actors, so as to be able to better identify the shifting lines of exclusion and 
inclusion that Brexit has produced, or at least made prominent. The paper ends with 
a proposal for a corresponding future research agenda on the ‘Brexit’ type of politics 
of belonging.  
Since our task affords several shifts in perspective, between empirical observations, 
theoretical framing and extrapolations into future research agendas, it assumes a 
somewhat unusual character. It combines the qualities of a thought piece on social 
change, a concept paper which seeks to address a permutable phenomenon of social 
practice which tends to escape well-known theoretical notions, and a research agenda 
statement. We intentionally maintain this multi-purpose design to encourage readers 
to become involved in open explorations of a still evolving social issue.  
 
Brexit literatures: at odds with ‘Brexit & belonging’ 
The basic idea we put forward has emerged from the insight that until now the social 
sciences have only partially grasped the multidimensionality of Brexit. In particular, 
the everyday impact of shifting political framings (i.e. from de-bordered EU-bound 
perspectives to re-nationalised, UK-centred ones) has only occasionally been 
addressed (Anderson and Wilson, 2017). There is hardly more than scattered 
assumptions that the former social, economic and political complexity of EU 
membership might persist but over time lose its power. Such complexity has been 
expressed by softened border regimes, the enhanced international mobility of capital 
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and labour, changing accessibility of member countries to new migrants (especially 
in the course of the recent refugee crisis), and new political and social commitments 
to the ideas of transnationalism and cosmopolitanism. All this constitutes an intricate 
web of powers, impacts, ideas, traded interdependencies and political obligations that 
have for decades had a transforming effect on British society.  
Consequently, Brexit has clear vernacular implications, which transcend the obvious. 
It is not simply a matter of political framing, economic restructuring and 
institutionalisation. Rather, against a threatening backdrop of contested institutions, 
rising mobilities and economic crisis British and EU citizens feel challenged to revise 
their everyday sense of belonging. As Cueppens and Geschiere (2005: 387) highlight 
in their analysis of belonging in Africa, belonging ‘promises safety, but in practice it 
raises fierce disagreement over who “really” belongs—over whose claims are 
authentic and whose are not.’ This involves the idea that individuals are generally 
certain about their roots. One obvious approach to belonging therefore is to 
understand it as a primordial concept. The recent rise in firmly grounded nationalism 
and right-wing populism seems to support this claim. It does not come as a surprise 
that this perspective has been made strong by studies, which see Brexit as a return to 
nationalism and a national identity, which used to be grounded on primordiality and 
the pride in the former British Empire (Richards and Smith, 2017; Calhoun, 2016; 
Newbigin, 2017). But do primordiality and nostalgia really play a decisive role in 
forming the opposing fractions of Brexiteers and Remainers? Or is it rather the 
situated social construction of ‘we’ under conditions of uncertainty that might create 
a wider sense of belonging? If so, the new ‘Brexit belonging’ research agenda has to 
acknowledge the growing complexity of references that people make when they 
achieve cognitive and emotional attachments to something, which they might address 
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as their home or safe basis for everyday action. Social analysis has to uncover the 
formative function of contextualised social practices, and shifting ways of producing 
social commonalities or differences.  
Having said this, we go on to assume that the particular analytical challenge, which 
Brexit poses, lies in its polarising quality. In contrast to former periods of relatively 
‘undisturbed’ social evolution, political and public discourses now indulge in 
seemingly excessive simplification. Discussants from all sides have subdued almost 
everything and everyone to a dichotomous logic of consent vs. dissent. Political 
contestation and everyday responses suggest that Brexit might simply be a matter of 
making the ‘right’ choices: either of re-nationalizing and finding one’s place in the 
world again by emphasising the national, or of voting for cosmopolitanism and open 
global exchange. This logic has left its imprints on research agendas, which envisage 
the effects of Brexit as an outcome of sweeping political events and corresponding 
binary decisions (Hobolt, 2016; Menon and Fowler, 2016).  
In practice, however, a strong element of transgression is being felt. Everyday 
belonging may refer to ‘binary decisions’ but it also involves affect, changing 
anticipation of individual futures, and a sense of how it will feel to live with 
accelerating changes. First empirical observations indicate that such anticipation 
involves a different sense of autochthony than provided by feelings of national 
identity, superiority or primordiality (Kaufmann, 2016; Balthazar, 2017). Being 
British or part of a ‘community at home’, or developing a sense of social-normality-
altered-by-Brexit, now may encompass a far broader understanding of social 
difference, inequality, separateness from others, and ‘natural’ in-/exclusion than the 
terms ‘national identity’ and ‘national belonging’ usually suggested in the past. The 
conceptual gap, which has opened here on the one hand extends to the question of 
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how complex everyday individual and collective references to political events 
actually are. On the other hand it incorporates the extent to which such references 
surpass the nationalist pattern of ‘we and the others’.  
Addressing this gap we start from a perspective, which is rooted in the idea of the 
mutable social construction of belonging. It encourages research which reflects upon 
the various political and everyday references that everyday actors make to 
heterogeneous items of belonging, social inclusion or feeling-at-home. At a 
superficial level, such references may be based on the re-adaptation of older concepts 
of national identity and belonging as offered by politics, thereby activating ready-to-
use stereotypes and collective feelings (Balthazar, 2017). At a deeper level, however, 
belonging may refer to more flexible, open and vague ideas of social 
(inter)relatedness which emerged during the very process of change.  
In the following we will have closer look at the particular challenges for the 
conceptualisation of the notion of belonging as posed by Brexit. We will proceed to 
a deepened discussion of the notion of autochthony and the conceptual links produced 
by theorizing belonging as implication of everyday intersectionality. The first part of 
the paper will thus close with a short conclusion concerning the possible advances in 
theory building on Brexit achieved by a contextualised linking of belonging-by-
autochthony and situated intersectionality. We will then proceed to a draft research 
agenda focusing on Brexit, which makes use of this compound concept.  
 
 
 
An altered theoretical perspective on belonging: autochthony 
7 
 
The concept of autochthony (Cueppens and Geschiere, 2005; Geschiere, 2009) we 
adopt here starts from the observation that belonging often affords a more or less 
concrete object of identification or social referencing to become viable (e.g. a visible 
community, a particular neighbourhood). While this requires socialities forged by 
direct social interaction and affective bonds, Brexit activates still another dimension 
of social life, which is based on the quasi-nationalist invocation of community. Such 
belonging reconciles the concrete with the abstract and produces a broader, if not 
comprehensive object of social imagination. Brexit made a definite change to 
everyday understandings of inclusion as now there is a felt imperative to decide who 
is a rightful autochthonous member of society (as opposed to a stranger or 
allochthon). This lays emphasis on larger groups and communities (‘the’ British 
society), which are implicitly made more relevant than just minorities or particular 
status groups. It provides a more universal mode of in-/exclusion, thereby seeking to 
shape the foundations of society, not its margins. Autochthonous belonging could be 
an even more powerful imaginary than other social categorizations such as ethnicity 
or culture, place or race (for problems of conceptualizing ethnicity see Jenkins, 2010). 
While such a broad categorical understanding of autochthony decentralizes well-
established categories of social difference and inequality, it nevertheless must refer 
back to everyday procedures of drawing social boundaries and establishing a sense of 
inclusion/exclusion that informs community building, solidarity and respect of others. 
Such procedures have been recently addressed by border studies when 
conceptualizing processes of bordering, debordering and rebordering (Cassidy, 
Yuval-Davis and Wemyss, 2018; Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and Cassidy, forthcoming), 
and by intersectionality studies when applying the idea of the continual social 
production of multiple overlays of inequality to bordering and its implications, in 
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particular processes of othering, social positioning and the emergence of belonging 
(McCall, 2005). The initial complexity of this approach dissipates into a streamlined 
perspective once the links between both concepts are considered in more detail.  
 
Using the dual notion of debordering/rebordering.  
This notion has been developed by recent border studies (Berg and van Houtum, 
2003; Dimitrovova, 2010) to clarify the everyday significance of the 
multidimensional flux of ideas and imaginaries directed towards political borders and 
persons/institutions perceived as being representative of borders. It involves shifting 
interpretations of what is on this side and beyond a border, and it is grounded in 
othering, which declares persons and objects as either familiar or foreign. Bordering 
therefore refers to incorporated social boundaries. It is not necessarily restricted to 
visible borders and demarcations but can also be practiced through addressing border-
crossers, migrants, social minorities, and others living next door (Yuval-Davis, 
Wemyss and Cassidy, 2018; Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and Cassidy, forthcoming). 
Political borders and everyday social boundaries thus interact. In particular, this 
approach seeks to explain how political shifts, institutional changes and legal 
amendments produce suggestions, normative propositions, constraints and 
imperatives which are then operationalized and developed in discourses led by 
ordinary citizens.  
 
 
Discussing the issue of shifting social in-/exclusion on the basis of the theoretical 
concept of intersectionality.  
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This approach assumes that intersecting axes of inequality continually define and alter 
the social positions of individuals and groups (Anthias, 2008; Crenshaw, 1991; 
McCall, 2005). Intersectionality is an outcome of the situational accumulation of 
heterogeneous aspects of inequality. It is liable to be reinforced by increasing pressure 
on ‘others’. Bordering nourishes intersectionality because it encourages everyday 
actors to think in inside/outside divisions, e.g. in the context of claims for rightful 
citizenship. In the particular case of Brexit pressure arises on people who have to 
prove that they have a right or a natural link to British society. Observable shifts in 
attitude towards others (who, for example, might lack features of received citizenship) 
may affect various other pre-existing forms of social exclusion and also add new 
dimensions of inequality by questioning the rightfulness of minority claims for 
inclusion and participation. We will consequently conceptualize new exclusion of the 
‘Brexit type’ as an outcome of situated gazes related to in-/exclusionary social 
practices (see Yuval-Davis, 2016; Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and Cassidy, 2018). At the 
same time such bordered intersectionality produces differential pathways to social 
positioning and corresponding belonging. Those who practice bordering from the 
standpoint of a majority mostly seek to define others from an imagined superior 
positioning that necessarily places others in an inferior position. Intersectionality 
helps to stabilize these assigned positions. This entails a sense of belonging to an 
imagined majority. Those who are subject to external positioning respond with self-
positioning, which may be reciprocal or geared towards emancipation. It involves the 
need to define an attitude of belonging, either to a majority which is approached for 
inclusion, or to a minority group which promises security or emancipation. Complex 
positioning and repositioning thus trigger complex procedures in creating senses of 
belonging.   
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Seen together, as interacting concepts, bordering and intersectionality can explain the 
everyday negotiation and emergence of social positioning and belonging. Their 
linkage creates apt scope for the theorizing of autochthony, e.g. as a concept which 
transcends individual axes of inequality and provides a more comprehensive 
understanding of ‘bordered’ inclusion. Within this comprehensiveness it may assume 
changing bias or focus, stressing one aspect of claimed-for autochthony at the expense 
of others. However it does not exclude them, at least not to the extent that one single 
category (e.g. race) takes over and monopolizes other axes involved. It will be the 
responsibility of close-up empirical exploration to develop theoretical statements 
about the relative position of autochthony within a specific social context. In the 
following two sections, we explore in more detail intersectionality and everyday life 
and autochthony, as framings for a research agenda that grasps the complexity and 
dynamics of belonging as it relates to Brexit. 
 
Social positioning, politically framed in-/exclusion and the bordered 
intersectional everyday 
Borders can be regarded as dynamic and creative discontinuities that play a crucial 
role in encouraging the multiple, complex interplay between political and territorial, 
as well as cultural and identitarian processes (Popescu, 2012). Bordering processes 
are made through practices, whether these are aimed at maintaining and strengthening 
them or at disrupting or subverting them (Reid, Graham & Nash 2013, p.5). These 
practices operationalize ‘symbols, signs, identifications, representations, 
performances and stories’ (van Houtum, Kramsch and Zierhofer, 2005). As we have 
argued above, to fully understand bordering emerging within the Brexit context – 
which is very much about rebordering, i.e. the re-making of borders – we need to 
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incorporate into our analysis both vernacular and situated intersectional perspectives 
(Yuval-Davis, 2014). The latter emphasizes the necessity to develop a multi-
epistemological approach, which considers the interrelationship between everyday 
practices and political struggles. It recognises the need to analyse Brexit as a 
dialogical, scale-transcending process, encompassing the situated gazes, knowledge 
and imaginations of the distinct social agents, emotional attachments and value 
systems involved (Yuval-Davis, 2011). 
The early categorical approach developed by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991) described 
intersectionality as multiple overlays and intersections of a limited number of axes of 
inequality, i.e. class, race and gender. According to Leslie McCall (2005) such inter-
categorical understandings must be told apart from intra-categorical approaches 
because intersectionality is not simply determined by abstract categories or gross axes 
of inequality; rather, it is continually embodied and enacted. It emerges within 
particular situations that individuals and social groups experience in everyday life 
(Winker and Degele, 2009). By integrating both perspectives, the latest approach of 
‘situated intersectionality’ (Yuval-Davis, 2015, 2016; Anthias, 2013) references the 
manifold sites of emergence of inequality, and their multi-scalar implications. 
Situated intersectionality may refer to seemingly unrelated items such as age, the 
availability of economic resources, access to citizenship or gender roles, but it also 
addresses ‘nearby’ items of social practice, e.g. the social image of an urban 
neighbourhood, local access to housing, and felt or aspired belonging to a local 
community. It therefore emphasizes the social divisions created by everyday 
bordering. These may relate to different degrees of citizenship or the exposure of 
groups and individuals to state and border control, often relocated to everyday 
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‘checkpoints’ where certain social groups are supposed to produce identity 
documents.  
Intersectionality analysis thus relates to the manifold (re)distribution of power and 
other resources through social practice and does not reduce the complexity of power 
constructions into a single social division, as has been prevalent, for instance, in neo-
Marxist stratification theory which would privilege class divisions (Anthias, 2001). 
The approach sees different social divisions as mutually constituted and shaped in a 
particular place-time (Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and Cassidy, forthcoming); different 
social divisions constitute each other but are irreducible to each other – each of them 
has a different ontological discourse of particular dynamics of power relations, 
exclusion and/or exploitation, using a variety of legitimate and illegitimate 
technologies of inferiorizations, intimidations and sometimes actual violence to 
achieve this (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1983; Yuval-Davis, 2006).  
Assuming a multi-localized and multi-dimensional emergence of inequality, we must 
account for the social positioning of the social agent – the researcher or the researched 
– and challenge ‘the god-trick of seeing everything from nowhere’ (Haraway 1991: 
189) as a cover and a legitimisation of a hegemonic masculinist ‘positivistic’ 
positioning. In Brexit this means avoiding essentialising discourses across UK society 
and beyond. Just as there is not one EU migrant positioning, so there is also not one 
‘Brexiteer’ or ‘Remainer’ positioning. Hence there are different facets of social 
analysis that must be elaborated upon by careful empirical exploration. Social actors 
are positioned along socio-economic grids of power; they develop experiential and 
identificatory perspectives of where they belong; and they think and act in terms of 
their normative value systems. These different facets are related to each other; they 
need to be studied as autonomous entities but also through their interrelatedness, 
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rather than assuming that they are automatically implied by each other as identity 
politics tend to do.  
 
Politics of belonging and autochthony: altered modes of in-/exclusion 
Autochthonic politics can be defined as the return of the local within the context of 
globalization (Geschiere, 2009: 1). Such politics imply strong claims for 
primordiality and particular forms of temporal-territorial racialization, of exclusion 
and inferiorization. Although they allude to traditional concepts of ‘natural’ 
belonging, autochthonic politics nevertheless are the outcome of mass immigration 
occurring under the impetus of globalization: they afford the relatively new presence 
of particular people and collectivities in particular places.  
Geschiere claims that ‘autochthony’ is a new phase of ethnicity. However it may be 
argued that it even surpasses ethnicity, which is highly constructed, relationally and 
situationally circumscribed, and therefore has particular time-space limits, as 
evidenced by categories such as the segregated settlement of ethnic groups. Following 
Geschiere, autochthony must rather be conceived as a much more ‘empty’ and thus 
elastic notion (Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and Cassidy, forthcoming). It is based upon the 
simple notion that ‘I was here before you’ and can, therefore, be re-defined and 
(re)applied in any situation.  
Acknowledging the multi-relational and multi-purpose quality of autochthony 
requires reflection on the arbitrary nature of insider-outsider relations. From a 
praxeological standpoint, as developed by the concept of situated intersectionality, 
virtually everything can serve as a feature of distinction between the local and the 
non-local. This view is supported by former studies on local insider-outsider relations, 
such as that carried out by Elias and Scotson (1965). They minutely described the 
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social context of post-war local history as constitutive of the practices of othering 
established by those who claimed to be autochthonous by their longer time of 
presence in a particular place. The older residents of a small community in the 
Midlands built up a habitus of superiority over newcomers by claiming that they had 
been there before, belonged to ‘old families’ and that the newcomers did not live up 
to more or less arbitrary standards that had already been established. The new 
residents not only belonged to a lower class but also had the ‘wrong’ manners, 
attitudes and other features that were defined and established by the autochthons as 
valid criteria for exclusion.  
This observation stemming from a completely different social setting emphasises the 
transgressive nature of the social construct of autochthony. It is not simply situated 
in the sense that it may originate from a singular event or configuration of social 
actors. It also implies a type of universality, which lies in the general openness of 
ascription that takes place. Some basic criteria of exclusion (such as a longer duration 
of residence, historical rights, a long-term genealogy of a group or society) seem to 
have a ‘convincing’ effect as they provide locals with powerful claims that cannot be 
suspended easily. These claims may touch upon ethnicity, class, gender, age, but they 
transcend them because there is always something that outsiders cannot imitate or 
acquire – even up to the claim that there is a collective spirit that outsiders cannot be 
part of. This dynamism of keeping others at a distance had been identified by Elias 
and Scotson (1965) as a matter of local conflict, generated by general post-war socio-
spatial mobility within a narrower national context of economic upswing. Claims for 
autochthony obviously served as a lubricant for connecting the situational with the 
general.  
15 
 
By analogy the difference that present-day globalization makes may only be gradual. 
It might owe itself to accelerated mobility, new complex geographies and 
temporalities, which are increasingly leading to a ‘liquid migration’ (Engbersen, 
2012) with individualized and unpredictable patterns through the open borders of 
multiple countries. Therefore it seems that pronounced politics of autochthony which 
had already been applied in former periods of social and political change are now 
becoming ever more popular. However this assumption needs more empirical 
substantiation to be transformed into a sustainable conceptual framework. 
Comparative studies of different historical situations would contribute to a better 
understanding of the origins and implementations of claims for autochthony.  
Furthermore in the age of reinforced globalization individuals willingly or 
unwillingly relate to each other on an unprecedented worldwide scale and pace. 
Among international migrants there is a strong sense of uprootedness, in spite of their 
expectation of easy accommodation to unfamiliar places. They need to make social 
and cultural ‘investments’ in belonging, partly because they feel they have to become 
more independent from exclusionary practices of locals they meet during their 
migration. Belonging therefore may refer to larger communities of ‘autochthones’ but 
existing exclusion often prevents it. Hence there are also strong aspirations by 
minorities to belong to smaller groups created by intersectional positioning, everyday 
bordering and exclusion – which makes it easier for those who ‘had been there before’ 
to perpetuate the state of affairs and claim that autochthony is a natural state of being.  
In the era of globalization making ‘investments’ in belonging has turned out to be a 
widespread and universal phenomenon, which also involves the permanent 
population. Facing the challenge of global reflexivity (Beck et al, 2003), expressed 
by quickly shifting markets, social relations and political conditions, it is for many 
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non-mobile residents rational to claim that they really belong – to a social community, 
a network of friends (including social media, see Metykova 2010), or a particular 
place. However there is a considerable gap between such claims and actual projects 
of ‘making belonging come true’. Therefore Yuval-Davis (2011) argues that we 
should differentiate between belonging and its politics. She associates the former with 
feeling ‘at home’ in a way that can become naturalized; the latter relates to the 
creating of a collective concept of home. So the idea of ‘home’ is linked to views on 
who has a right to share the home and who does not belong within it. Often such 
politics remain latent, unarticulated, until (as with Brexit) some form of ‘threat’ is 
produced and the objective of belonging becomes articulated, formally structured and 
pronouncedly politicized.   
 
The staging of autochthonic politics of belonging by Brexit: a research agenda  
So far we have discussed the politics of belonging as a phenomenon that arises out of 
particular social practices, often from the perspective of migrants and people who 
have to find a legitimation to ‘be there’ or to join a community after having crossed 
political borders. The role of insiders or locals is still underrepresented, mainly 
because there is limited empirical evidence available – see for example the recent At 
Home in Europe report on Manchester, part of a six-city series on the white working 
class (Open Society Foundations, 2014). The following considerations propose a 
potential research agenda, which focuses on the ‘autochthonous’ groups of the 
population and the politics of belonging that addresses them as Brexit unfolds. Three 
analytical subjects appear to be promising:  
i) Belonging through everyday rebordering and multidimensional immigration 
control; 
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ii) Belonging through political projects, e.g. state citizenship; 
iii) Belonging through political and media discourses reflecting the British sense of 
otherness/distinction. 
 
i) Belonging through everyday rebordering and immigration control 
Everyday rebordering often refers to nationalist distinctions of otherness. But who 
practically belongs to the British society and who does not? This question is not banal; 
it cannot be reduced to the question of state citizenship but has much more to do with 
cultural connectivity and the everyday negotiation of inclusion. Innocenti (2015) has 
argued that from racism to xenophobia, from religious intolerance to gender and 
sexual discrimination, we are surrounded by evidence that cultural beliefs are 
sometimes in conflict with principles of equality as set out in the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
From this perspective, processes of preservation and transmission of cultural 
identities require a necessary selection and appraisal on the basis of human rights and 
equal societies. These are the true challenges and hard work of intercultural dialogue 
and cultural citizenship. 
State citizenship would automatically include everyone from the former British 
colonies but it is clear that people of colour stemming from these regions are not 
easily accepted. Nonetheless, we have recently seen growing discomfort in Britain 
over the exclusion of long-settled migrants from the former colonies through 
everyday bordering. The so-called ‘Windrush scandal’, provided a clear example of 
the shifting boundaries of autochthonous belonging, when demands were made for 
the inclusion of a group excluded by changes in immigration policy (primarily since 
2014) on a ‘exceptional’ basis – that of their contribution to the British economy and 
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society, but also, importantly, on the basis that they were specifically ‘invited’ to the 
UK and ‘belonged’ to her Empire. Much of the discourse supporting the rights of the 
Windrush migrants was actively framed in such a way as to highlight their difference 
from those who have migrated from Europe in particular in more recent times 
(Harewood, 2018; Younge, 2018). Although there is some state effort towards 
voluntary inclusion, everyday resentments and factual discrimination continue to 
have their effects. In particular, the maelstrom of intersectionality not only continues, 
it is even likely to be reinforced by the individually felt request to personally decide 
who or what is autochthonous or compatible with an imagined ‘home’. Who claims 
to have always ‘been there’? Does the imagined British ‘we’ during and after Brexit 
include a different selection of people (with different features) than before? In which 
ways does it go beyond former ethnic or racial lines of demarcation? 
As these few considerations demonstrate, the quest for belonging creates an arena 
where the conditions of in/exclusion are negotiated against the backdrop of 
intersectionality and flexible criteria of autochthony. In practice, autochthonic 
politics of belonging is superior to other types of social exclusion because it has a 
very positive connotation. Who can oppose the objective of feeling at home? The 
contemporary populist extreme right politics of which a large part of Brexit is an 
example claims just that (Dathan, 2015). Supporters can argue that they are ‘not 
racist’, although they are very much against all those who ‘do not belong’. At the 
same time they claim that they are against any ‘dilution’ of nation and culture as a 
result of those who do not belong being allowed entry into the country. 
 
ii) Belonging through political projects 
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Belonging through political projects is the other, formal side of the quest for 
belonging, which nevertheless has important everyday implications. Political projects 
of belonging seek to construct particular collectivities with specified boundaries, 
often relating to a locality/territory (Antonsich, 2010). The project with which many 
of us are most familiar is state citizenship. Whilst the UK permits dual citizenship, 
political discourse often challenges those who claim expansive belonging well 
beyond one nation-state. For example, in 2016 Theresa May stated, 'if you believe 
you are a citizen of the world, you're a citizen of nowhere'. Citizenship provides a 
formal frame for developing relevant signifiers of belonging, e.g. individual and 
collective traits which stand for particular homogeneities (Yuval-Davis, 2011). By 
assembling more or less homogeneous subgroups under the umbrella of the nation 
state control of diversity is managed. Complete homogeneity is not needed as long as 
there is a general consensus about the usefulness of the state. When people travel to 
other countries they are usually identified by their nationality-expressed-through-
state citizenship, although this subsumes the individual under a category where he 
often does not want to be. Social inequality and the everyday contestation of 
belonging easily ‘disappear’ under the impact of formal identification, leaving an 
uneasy feeling of heteronomy. Brexit is liable to reinforce such a sense of heteronomy 
as it demands everyone take an unequivocal stand. The polarization of the British 
population into ‘Brexiteers’ and ‘Remainers’ is a project of homogenization under 
the banner of autochthony, with unclear effects for the actual sense of belonging that 
resides under the cover of what can be formally (re)produced. Imaginaries of 
dichotomous alternatives may override more complex individual positionings and 
related belongings so that many ‘undesirable’ or ‘inappropriate’ orientations are made 
visible. They might render ‘other’ people as non-belonging although at the level of 
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everyday practices they do not interfere with other members of the civil society. Such 
labelling of ‘deviant’ individuals and groups under state surveillance has been 
practiced since the ‘global war on terrorism’ when many started to be identified 
everywhere by their presumed religious affiliation. This collective experience and its 
homogenizing effect might have built a basis on which the dichotomous orientation 
and decision pro vs. con Brexit has been established. Moreover, it has the side effect 
of rendering intersectionality and the making of inequality invisible – they simply 
disappear under the cover of dichotomous ascriptions. This effect may be politically 
desirable for those who seek to manage uncertainties and systemic destabilization 
during a period of radical change. 
There is still another impact that the state has on the formation of autochthony. 
‘Undesirable’ racial or religious belonging is not as important in everyday othering 
as the general construction of people as non-belonging. Agamben (1995, p. 114) has 
pointed out that refugees are constructed around a major paradox: ‘in the nation-state 
system, the so-called sacred and inalienable rights of man prove to be completely 
unprotected at the very moment it is no longer possible to characterise them as rights 
of citizens of a state’. He further adds that ‘by breaking up the identity between man 
and citizen, between nativity and nationality, the refugee throws into crisis the 
original fiction of sovereignty’ (Agamben, 1995, p.115). A deeper driver of 
homogenization than the one described in the preceding paragraph might therefore 
exist in political fears of admitting the crisis of sovereignty beyond its symbolic 
visibility in the key figure of the refugee. Brexit poses a fundamental crisis of 
sovereignty as it forces the state to re-claim what it partially had delegated to the EU, 
e.g. an undisputed legislation or the right to devise external policies at (national) will. 
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The political rationale of keeping together what might get lost by negligence virtually 
affords an imaginary of solid autochthony.  
 
iii) Belonging through political and media discourses reflecting the British sense of 
otherness/distinction 
During the recent economic and political EU crisis the national media often 
renounced their former role as independent commentators on political struggles, 
openly aligning themselves with an assumed ‘right’ cause and the ‘right’ conflict 
partners. While subjective claim making has been an important long-term feature of 
media journalism operating within the EU’s political public (Pfetsch, Adam & 
Eschner, 2010), recent crises seemed to further deepen such alignments. This was 
evident in the Ukraine crisis where ‘western’ media sought to establish a 
homogeneous view of the old and new ‘cold war enemy’ Russia (Barthel & Bürkner, 
forthcoming). A similar way of engaging in polarized debates can be observed in 
domestic media representations of Brexit where support for a particular cause seems 
to prevail. While polarization and the exaggeration of opposition or conflict has 
always been the domain of the media, for their visibility and economic viability, the 
current wave of polarized coverage and commentary clearly exceeds former media 
practices.  
In particular, there is a pronounced bias in favour of everything that indicates the 
importance of being British, being at home, or defending one’s home against alien 
impact. This comes with a detailed rejection of such impact, including descriptions 
of potentially adverse or harmful agents representing the ‘other’ side. In political 
terms the EU, its regulations, politicians and the heads of continental national 
governments are easily identified as potential or factual opponents. These 
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representations range from exaggerated suggestions concerning the influence that EU 
regulations have over the shape of the bananas being sold in Britain (Johnson, 2016 
cited in Simons, 2016) to narratives that heads of state from the EU’s largest nation-
states held too much power over decision-making within the EU (Farage, 2016). Also 
the visible outcomes of lacking immigration control or other ‘defence’ against non-
British influence, fostered by EU practices, are placed under suspicion of not fully 
belonging, including migrants and other social representatives of failed EU policies. 
This imaginary of ‘us against the EU’, endlessly repeated in reports across the whole 
political spectrum of the media, has established a solid sense of autochthony beyond 
formal political objectives and everyday social practices. It has laid the foundations 
of what might be called ‘autochthony as common sense’: everybody who wants to be 
regarded as a reasonable citizen should know where his/her home is and where he/she 
belongs, regardless if he/she is a ‘Brexiteer’ or ‘Remainer’. Increasingly, it has been 
suggested that this ‘Us’ and process of rebordering the EU involves a debordering of 
citizens of Britain’s former Empire, whether through a form of nostalgia (Harewood, 
2018; Younge, 2018), through the exceptional treatment of Windrush migrants within 
the wider ‘hostile environment’ or the re-imagining of Ireland as non-European 
(Bassett, 2018 cited in Halligan, 2018). However, these discourses are undermined 
by the promise of a new ‘mobility framework’ within the Chequers White Paper, 
which suggests a continued preferential positioning for EU citizens, whilst at the same 
time setting up the same possibilities for ‘other close trading partners in the future’ 
(HM Government, 2018). Nonetheless, the normative underpinning of otherwise 
existing political orientations, feelings, and imaginaries may support and legitimize 
processes of othering that have already been implied in a variety of social practices. 
The feeling that one naturally belongs to the ‘better’ or ‘legitimate’ side of things may 
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now give more impetus to the repulsion of what has been identified as being different 
or alien.  
 
Conclusion: autochthony as an ambiguous collective project 
In this paper we have argued that Brexit has given the everyday concept of 
autochthony new importance, revealing a multifaceted arena of negotiating social 
inequality, in/exclusion, intersectionality, othering and belonging. This complexity of 
constructing a ‘home’ clearly exceeds former nationalist representations and practices 
of ‘being British’ or belonging to the UK. It affects the very foundations of society in 
that it demands dichotomous decisions pro or con, an assumed commonality which 
can only partly be shared by many, has probably never existed before and cannot be 
achieved, except at the cost of complete social homogeneity or totalitarian rule.  
We have suggested that in spite of its basic inconsistency the social construct of 
autochthony is appealing for politics, the media, social majorities and minorities 
alike. For those national power elites it promises to unite a deeply unsettled and 
fragmented society, making social inequality and intersectionality a temporarily 
forgotten or secondary issue. For the powerless or non-established, it promises to 
create a pathway to inclusion that had formerly been barred by ethnic, racial, gender-
related and other traits. The dark side of autochthony, however, lies in the 
arbitrariness of the criteria of in/exclusion, and in the uncertain outcomes of the 
various politics of belonging favoured by majorities and minorities. Claims for 
creating a new home, and demands for confessing the ‘right’ belonging, might create 
new dividing lines between social groups and individuals based on othering and 
rebordering. These divisions might be harder to overcome than older ones because 
they are fuzzy (Fowler, 2002), situational and exposed to arbitrary contestation. 
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Compared to class struggles or racial conflict they make it more difficult for everyone 
to create a sustainable sense of belonging and not to interfere with rapidly shifting 
lines of distinction or exclusion. As a result, for those with experience in building 
solidarities and alliances to resist more traditional tropes of exclusion, these new 
autochthonic politics are not only challenging, but can also make resistance along 
these lines seem out-dated and irrelevant. Situated intersectionality, enhanced by 
shifting social ascriptions and flexible social practices, may become an increasingly 
important feature of the social transformation that Brexit has initiated.  
In particular, prevalent understandings of autochthony, which at the beginning had 
supposedly been defined by societal majorities, may now set the agenda over shifting 
modes of in-/exclusion. These understandings might embrace minorities, which were 
formerly excluded, and they might also create new lines of social demarcation, which 
delimit the choices that minorities have when developing their standpoints and senses 
of belonging. Intersectionality, then, is not only a matter of accumulating axes of 
exclusion but of incorporating them into a shifting field of everyday negotiations 
about autochthonic belonging, which gender theory had formerly attributed to a more 
or less unchangeable set of framing conditions. Rather, the present turmoil takes basic 
dispositions of 'intersectional' social positioning right into the middle of a shifting 
field of widening negotiations about autochthonous belonging. This gives individual 
axes of inequality an unusual embedding and provokes their situational reorientation. 
It follows that exclusion can be explained as emerging from a stream of ideation that 
is informed by constant and contingent reshaping of a general sense of belonging, 
which gives individual axes of inequality a particular leaning. We recommended that 
future research agendas focusing on political and social practices trace such 
dynamism of social integration/disintegration-by-autochthony in more detail. Brexit 
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provides a quasi-experimental research environment in that it places all social 
subjects between dichotomous belonging and the broadening of formerly tightly knit 
social divisions. The outcome is not only new individual and group struggles for 
endurable social positionings; there is also scope for extended political manipulation. 
Recent populist undertones in public discourses indicate that the political contestation 
of belonging is amongst the most intricate problems that 'managers' of Brexit will 
have to resolve. 
 
References 
Amilhat-Szary, A.-L., & Giraut, F. (2015). Borderities: The Politics of Contemporary 
Mobile Borders. In A.-L. Amilhat-Szary, & F. Giraut (Eds.), Borderities and the 
politics of contemporary mobile borders (pp. 1–19). London: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Anderson, B. (2006) Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of 
nationalism. London, New York: Verso. 
Anderson, B., & Wilson, H.F. (2017). Everyday Brexits. Area, DOI: 
10.1111/area.12385, pp. 1-5. 
Anthias, F. (2001). The Concept of ‘Social Division’ and Theorising Social 
Stratification: Looking at Ethnicity and Class. Sociology, 35(4), 835–854. 
Anthias, F. (2008). Thinking through the lens of translocational positionality: an 
intersectionality frame for understanding identity and belonging. Translocations: 
Migration and Social Change, 4(1), 5–20. 
Anthias, F. (2013). Intersectional what? Social divisions, intersectionality and levels 
of analysis. Ethnicities, 13(1), pp.3–19. 
Anthias, F., & Yuval-Davis, N. (1983). Contextualizing Feminism: Gender, Ethnic 
and Class Division. Feminist Review, 15(1), 62–75. 
26 
 
Antonsich, M. (2010) Search for a belonging-an analytical framework. Geography 
Compass. 4(6), pp.644-659. 
Agamben, G. (1995) We refugees. Symposium 49(20), pp.114-119 (trans. Michael 
Rocke) 
Balibar, E. (2002) Politics and the Other Scene. London, New York: Verso. 
Balthazar, AC. (2017) Made in Britain: Brexit, teacups, and the materiality of the 
nation. American Ethnologist, 44, pp.220-224. 
Barthel, M., & Bürkner, H.-J. (forthcoming). Ukraine and the big moral divide: What 
biased media coverage means to East European borders. Geopolitics 
Beck, U., Bonss, W., & Lau, C. (2003). The Theory of Reflexive Modernization: 
Problematic, Hypotheses and Research Programme. Theory, Culture & Society, 
20(2), pp.1–33. 
Berg, E., & van Houtum, H. (2003). Prologue: A Border Is Not a Border. Writing and 
Reading Borders in Space. In E. Berg, & H. van Houtum (Eds.), Routing Borders 
between Territories, Discourses and Practices (pp. 1–13). Aldershot, Burlington: 
Ashgate.  
Bottici, C. (2007). A Philosophy of Political Myth. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Bürkner, H.-J. (2015). Beyond Constructivism: Europeanisation and Bordering 
under the Impact of Power and Imaginaries. In C. Brambilla, J. Laine, J.W. Scott, 
and G. Bocchi (Eds.), Borderscaping: Imaginations and practices of border making 
(pp. 27-40). London: Ashgate. 
Casas-Cortes, M., Cobarrubias, S., & Pickles, J. (2013). Re-bordering the 
neighbourhood: Europe's emerging geographies of non-accession integration. 
European Urban and Regional Studies, 20(1), pp.37–58. 
27 
 
Calhoun, C. (2016) Brexit Is a Mutiny Against the Cosmopolitan Elite. New 
Perspectives Quarterly, 33: 50-58.  
Cassidy, K., Wemyss, G. & Yuval-Davis, N. (2018). Debordering and everyday 
(re)bordering in and of Dover: Post-borderland borderscapes. Political Geography. 
Available online: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.04.005 
Crenshaw, K. (1991). Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and 
violence against women of color. Stanford Law Review, 43(6), pp.1241–1299.  
Cueppens, B. & Geschiere, P. (2005). Autochthony: Local or Global? New Modes 
in the Struggle over Citizenship and Belonging in Africa and Europe. Annual review 
of Anthropology. 34, pp.385-407. 
Dathan, M. (2015, September 25). Nigel Farage calls for Ukip unity as he declares: 
'We want our country back'. The Independent. Retrieved from 
https://www.theindependent.co.uk 
Deleuze, G. (1992) ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’ October 59: 3-7. 
Dimitrovova, B. (2010). Cultural Bordering and Re-Bordering in the EU's 
Neighbourhood: Members, Strangers or Neighbours? Journal of Contemporary 
European Studies, 18(4), pp.463–481. 
Donnan, H. & Wilson, T. (1999). Borders. Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State. 
Oxford: Berg. 
Elias, N. & Scotson JL. (1965) The Established and the Outsiders: A Sociological 
Enquiry into Community Problems London: Frank Cass. 
Engbersen, G. (2012). Migration transitions in an era of liquid migration. Reflections 
on Fassmann and Reeger. In M. Okolski (Ed.), Europe: The continent of immigrants: 
Trends, structures and policy implications (91–105). Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press. 
28 
 
Farage, N. (2016, 21 June) Nigel Farage: Why we must vote LEAVE in the EU 
referendum Express Available online here 
https://www.express.co.uk/comment/expresscomment/681776/nigel-farage-eu-
referendum-brexit-vote-leave-independence-ukip Accessed on 18 March 2018. 
Foucault, M. (1977) Discipline and punish : the birth of the prison New York 
:Pantheon Books 
Fowler, B. (2002) Fuzzing Citizenship, Nationalising Political Space: A Framework 
for Interpreting the Hungarian “Status Law” as a New Form of KinState Policy in 
Central and Eastern Europe’, in Z. Kántor, B. Majtényi, O. Ieda, B. Vizi and I. 
Halász (eds) The Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority 
Protection Sapporo: Slavic Research Center at Hokkaido University, pp. 177–238. 
Geschiere, P. (2009). The perils of belonging. Autochthony, citizenship, and exclusion 
in Africa and Europe. Chicago, London: Univ. of Chicago Press. 
Gilmartin, M. Burke, P. and O’Callaghan, C. (2018) Borders, Mobility and 
Belonging in the Era of Brexit and Trump. Bristol: Policy Press. 
Halligan, L. (2018, February 17) Ireland's 'big mistake is backing EU' in Brexit 
negotiations, says former Irish Ambassador The Telegraph Available online at 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/02/17/irelands-big-mistake-backing-eu-
brexit-negotiations-says-former/ Accessed on 20 May 2018. 
Haraway, DJ. (1991). Simians, cyborgs and women: the reinvention of nature. 
London: Free Association Books. 
Harewood, D. (2018, April 16) I’ll fight for the Windrush generation – their 
treatment has been shameful The Guardian Available online at 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/16/windrush-generation-
shameful-treatment-racism Accessed on 18 April 2018. 
29 
 
HM Government (2018, July 6) Statement from HM Government. Available online 
at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/723460/CHEQUERS_STATEMENT_-_FINAL.PDF Accessed on 
20 July 2018. 
Hobolt, SB. (2016). The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent. Journal 
of European Public Policy, 23(9), pp.1259-1277. 
Innocenti, P. (2015). Cultural Networks in Migrating Heritage: Intersecting Theories 
and Practices across Europe. London: Routledge. 
Jenkins, R. (2010). Rethinking ethnicity: Identity, categorization and power. Ethnic 
and Racial Studies, 17(2), 197–223. 
Karim, F. (2017, December 20). Oxfordshire fishery lands itself in trouble by banning 
Polish anglers from lake. The Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk 
Kaufmann, E. (2016) It’s NOT the economy, stupid: Brexit as a story of personal 
values. British Politics and Policy at LSE (07 Jul 2016) [online]. Available at 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/71585/. Accessed on 8th May 2018. 
May, T (2016). Speech to Conservative Party Conference 2016. [Online] 5th October 
2016 [Accessed 10 January 2018]. Retrieved from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=08JN73K1JDc 
McCall, L. (2005). The Complexity of Intersectionality. Signs. Journal of Women in 
Culture and Society, 30(3), 1771-1800. 
Menon, A. & Fowler, B. (2016). Hard or soft? The politics of Brexit. National 
Institute Economic Review, 238(1), pp.R4-R12. 
30 
 
Metykova, M. (2010). Only a mouse click away from home : transnational practices 
of Eastern European migrants in the United Kingdom. Social Identities, 16 (3), 325-
338. 
Mindus, P. (2017). European citizenship after Brexit: Freedom of movement and 
rights of residence. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Open Society Foundations (2014). At Home in Europe. Europe‘s White Working 
Class Communities. Manchester. Available online at 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/white-working-class-
communities-manchester-20140616.pdf 
Newbigin, E. (2017) ‘Brexit, Nostalgia and the Great British Fantasy’ Open 
Democracy Available online at http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25232/1/newbigin-
opendemocracy.net-brexit-nostalgia-and-the-great-british-fantasy.pdf Accessed on 
20 May 2018. 
Pasha-Robinson, L. (2017, October 21). Pregnant British woman ordered by NHS to 
prove she is from UK to receive free treatment. The Independent. Retrieved from 
https://www.independent.co.uk 
Pfetsch, B., Adam, S., & Eschner, B. (2010). The Media's Voice over Europe: Issue 
Salience, Openness, and Conflict Lines in Editorials. In R. Koopmans, & P. Statham 
(Eds.), The making of a European public sphere. Media discourse and political 
contention (pp. 151–170). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Popescu, G. (2015). Controlling Mobility: Embodying Borders. In A.-L. Amilhat-
Szary, & F. Giraut (Eds.). Borderities and the politics of contemporary mobile 
borders (pp. 100-115). London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Popescu, G. (2012). Bordering and Ordering the Twenty-first Century. Lanham, 
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. 
31 
 
Portes, J. (2016). Immigration after Brexit. National Institute Economic Review, 
238(1), pp.13–21. 
Reid, MB., Graham, B. & Nash C. (2013) Partitioned Lives: the Irish Borderlands. 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Richards, D. & Smith, M. (2017). ‘Things were better in the past’: Brexit and the 
Westminster fallacy of democratic nostalgia Available online at 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/81867/1/blogs.lse.ac.uk-
Things%20were%20better%20in%20the%20past%20Brexit%20and%20the%20We
stminster%20fallacy%20of%20democratic%20nostalgia.pdf Accessed on 21 May 
2018. 
Rumford, C. (2008). Introduction: Citizens and borderwork in Europe. Space and 
Polity 12(1), pp.1-12. 
Simons, N. (2016, May 17) Boris Johnson Claims EU Stops Bananas Being Sold 
In Bunches Of More Than Three. That Is Not True. The Huffington Post Available 
online at https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/boris-johnson-claims-eu-stops-
bananas-being-sold-in-bunches-of-more-than-three-that-is-not-
true_uk_573b2445e4b0f0f53e36c968 Accessed on 20 May 2018.  
Smith, H. (2017, February 13). Landlords' immigration checks 'fueling 
discrimination', report says. The Independent. Retrieved from 
https://www.independent.co.uk 
Travis, A (2017, September 22). Home Office wrongly denying people bank accounts 
in 10% of cases. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com 
van Houtum, H., Kramsch, O., & Zierhofer, W. (2005). Prologue: B/ordering. In H. 
van Houtum, O. Kramsch, & W. Zierhofer (Eds.), B/ordering Space (pp. 1–13). 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
32 
 
van Houtum, H. (2011). ‘The Mask of the Border’. In Companion to Border Studies, 
edited by D. Wastl-Walter, pp.4–62. Farnham: Ashgate. 
van Houtum, H. & van Naerssen, T. (2002). ‘Bordering, Ordering and Othering’. 
Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie) 93(2): pp.125–36. 
Vaughan-Williams, N. (2008). Borderwork beyond Inside/Outside? Frontex, the 
Citizen-Detective and the War on Terror. Space and Polity, 12(1), pp.63–79. 
Wemyss, G. (2015). Everyday Bordering and Raids Every Day: The Invisible 
Empire and Metropolitan Borderscapes. In C. Brambilla, J. Laine, J.W. Scott, and 
G. Bocchi (Eds.), Borderscaping: Imaginations and practices of border making (pp. 
187-196). London: Ashgate. 
Winker, G., & Degele, N. (2009). Intersektionalität. Zur Analyse sozialer 
Ungleichheiten [Intersectionality: Towards the analysis of social inequalities]. 
Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag. 
Younge, G. (2018, April 13) Hounding commonwealth citizens is no accident. It’s 
cruelty by design. The Guardian Available online at 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/13/commonwealth-citizens-
harassment-british-immigration-policy Accessed on 16 April 2018. 
Yuval-Davis, N. (2006). Intersectionality and Feminist Politics. The European 
Journal of Women's Studies, 13(3), pp.193–209. 
Yuval-Davis, N. (2011). The politics of belonging: Intersectional contestations. 
London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, Singapore: Sage.  
Yuval-Davis, N. (2012). ‘The double crisis of governability and governmentality’ 
Soundings 52(12): pp.88-99. 
Yuval-Davis, N. (2014). A Situated Intersectional Everyday Approach to the Study 
of Bordering (EUBORDERSCAPES Working Paper, 2). Joensuu: Univ. of Eastern 
33 
 
Finland. Retrieved from 
http://www.euborderscapes.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/Working_Papers/EUBORDE
RSCAPES_Working_Paper_2_Yuval-Davis.pdf. 
Yuval-Davis, N. (2015). Situated intersectionality: a reflection on Ange-Marie 
Hancock’s forthcoming book: intersectionality—an intellectual history. New 
Political Science, 37(4), pp.637–642. 
Yuval-Davis, N. (2016). Power, Intersectionality and the Politics of Belonging. In W. 
Harcourt (Ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Gender and Development (pp. 367–381). 
London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Yuval-Davis, N., Wemyss, G, & Cassidy, K. (2017). Everyday Bordering, Belonging 
and the Reorientation of British Immigration Legislation. Sociology. Advance online 
publication. doi: 10.1177/0038038517702599. 
Yuval-Davis, N., Wemyss, G, & Cassidy, K (2018, forthcoming). Bordering. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
